Taliban and isis relationship with al qaeda

Mapped: The Taliban’s Strongholds in Afghanistan – Foreign Policy

taliban and isis relationship with al qaeda

The story of how al-Qaeda managed to succeed as ISIS collapsed in ostensibly trying to fight al-Qaeda and its Taliban allies, al-Qaeda is. So-called Islamic State, the Taliban, and al-Qaeda are all radical jihadist of regional movements that have little connection with one another. al qaeda organisation; this number can only have grown in the last year. isis. as ISIS, ISIL, or by the Arabic acronym Da'esh) and the the Taliban is not an affiliate of Al Qaeda and has not been . relationship” with AQ.

ISIS, Al Qaeda or Taliban - Muslims or Western Agents?

Al-Qaeda is a way of working Al-Bahri described al-Qaeda's formal administrative structure and vast arsenal. Curtis contended the name "al-Qaeda" was first brought to the attention of the public in the trial of bin Laden and the four men accused of the US embassy bombings in East Africa.

taliban and isis relationship with al qaeda

The reality was that bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri had become the focus of a loose association of disillusioned Islamist militants who were attracted by the new strategy.

But there was no organization. These were militants who mostly planned their own operations and looked to bin Laden for funding and assistance. He was not their commander. There is also no evidence that bin Laden used the term "al-Qaeda" to refer to the name of a group until after September 11 attacks, when he realized that this was the term the Americans had given it.

The name of the organization and details of its structure were provided in the testimony of Jamal al-Fadlwho said he was a founding member of the group and a former employee of bin Laden. There were selective portions of al-Fadl's testimony that I believe was false, to help support the picture that he helped the Americans join together. I think he lied in a number of specific testimony about a unified image of what this organization was. It made al-Qaeda the new Mafia or the new Communists.

It made them identifiable as a group and therefore made it easier to prosecute any person associated with al-Qaeda for any acts or statements made by bin Laden. The number of individuals in the group who have undergone proper military training, and are capable of commanding insurgent forces, is largely unknown. Documents captured in the raid on bin Laden's compound in show that the core al-Qaeda membership in was The lack of any significant numbers of convicted al-Qaeda members, despite a large number of arrests on terrorism charges, was cited by the documentary as a reason to doubt whether a widespread entity that met the description of al-Qaeda existed.

The first, numbering in the tens of thousands, was "organized, trained, and equipped as insurgent combat forces" in the Soviet—Afghan war. Many of these fighters went on to fight in Bosnia and Somalia for global jihad. Another group, which numbered 10, inlive in the West and have received rudimentary combat training. Batterjee was designated as a terror financier by the US Department of the Treasury inand Julaidan is recognized as one of al-Qaeda's founders.

Mapped: The Taliban’s Strongholds in Afghanistan

Qatar and state-sponsored terrorism and Qatar diplomatic crisis Several Qatari citizens have been accused of funding al-Qaeda. Nuaimi was also accused of investing funds in the charity directed by Humayqani to ultimately fund AQAP.

Subayi's name was added to the UN Security Council 's Sanctions List in on charges of providing financial and material support to al-Qaeda senior leadership. Al-Qaeda defector al-Fadl, who was a former member of Qatar Charity, testified in court that Abdullah Mohammed Yusef, who served as Qatar Charity's director, was affiliated to al-Qaeda and simultaneously to the National Islamic Fronta political group that gave al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden harbor in Sudan in the early s.

Arnaout revealed that Qatar Charity was cited by Bin Laden in as one of the charities used to channel financial support to al-Qaeda operatives overseas. This accusation was publicly denied by Hamad bin Nasser al-Thani. The funding is primarily channeled through kidnapping for ransom.

Al-Nusra acknowledged a Qatar-sponsored campaign "as one of the preferred conduits for donations intended for the group". Please update this article to reflect recent events or newly available information.

Al-Qaeda - Wikipedia

Provoke the United States and the West into invading a Muslim country by staging a massive attack or string of attacks on US soil that results in massive civilian casualties.

Another branch, established inwas al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, which is composed of Algerian jihadis and is now a source of disruption through North Africa and the Sahel region. Beyond Western interventions in the Middle East, domestic political breakdowns have also been a gold mine for terrorist groups.

taliban and isis relationship with al qaeda

In the s, civil wars in Algeria and in the Balkans were incubators of extremism. The Arab Spring gave terrorist groups more opportunities to wage their war. The turmoil in Syria that started infor example, allowed the Islamic State to establish a territorial caliphate in stretches of Iraq and Syria.

Its lightning-speed military march on an Iraqi army trained and equipped by Americans was stunning.

taliban and isis relationship with al qaeda

The Islamic State still has something like 30, fighters in Iraq. But its most enduring contribution to the jihadi cause may well be its declaration of the caliphate, however ill-fated, because it inspired terrorism and drew in foreign fighters around the globe. Now, although the rebel cause is in sharp decline in Syria, jihadis are still major players.

In short, the jihadi movement has proved remarkably resilient throughout the twists and turns of the last two decades. The coalition was on the brink of bringing down the regime when French forces came to the rescue.

They saved the Malian state but pushed violence over its borders. In hybrid conflicts like these, where transnational terrorists have embedded among local rebels with legitimate grievances, it is impossible to distinguish counterterrorism from counterinsurgency—or to separate either strategy from the formidable task of state-building.

Major intervening powers such as the United States and France must depend on their own local allies, who are in many cases reluctant partners in the war on terrorism and whose interests do not necessarily align with those of their patrons. More often than not, moreover, outside intervention ends an immediate crisis but leaves unresolved or even exacerbates the underlying problems that brought it about.

Also making jihadi terrorism difficult to wipe out is the diffuse and shifting character of the movement. There is no single monolithic entity that can be decisively defeated. For now, the major fault line is between al Qaeda and the Islamic State, but many other fissures and disagreements divide jihadis.

taliban and isis relationship with al qaeda

Internal power struggles undermine unity, as do doctrinal and strategic disputes. The al Qaeda-Islamic State quarrel broke into the open afterand Islamic State branches soon sprung up in areas where al Qaeda had been dominant. In Nigeria, Boko Haram decided to engage in the new competition by defecting to the Islamic State—leading to subsequent splintering.

Time for Peace Talks With ISIS and Al Qaeda?

Al Qaeda, meanwhile, has gone through its own internal divisions after parting ways with its former Iraqi subordinate. Whereas al Qaeda had always advocated an international jihadi revolutionary effort, its Syrian offshoot preferred to concentrate on Syria. This lack of unity among jihadis might be interpreted as a sign of weakness, and governments do often seek to sow dissension in the ranks of the adversary. One alternative is to try to solve the root causes of the problem by removing the conditions that make jihad attractive.

But even if the multiple political, economic, and social causes of violence could be identified, addressing them is a costly endeavor requiring a good deal of patience and persistence. Since the short term is what we have to work with, negotiation might be a viable option under the right circumstances.

The traditional view is that jihadis are generally too absolutist to bargain. And indeed, some are just that obstinate.

taliban and isis relationship with al qaeda