Indeed, time-series analysis of the central-local government relationship within a single .. More business-like methods of managementwere for example. This book examines the connection between central-local government relations and the transition of contemporary China, the urbanization process and social. Should central or local governments be responsible for collection and fees for services, local business licences and taxes on immobile assets. The latter are.
The most distinctive feature of this system of government is that there is only one source of state authority allowing a higher possibility for the uniform application of laws and policies to all parts of the country. Kurebwa J [ 3 ] pointed out that in unitary systems, although it is often necessary for the effective local expression of state power to have an administration at the local level, such local governments exist only as mere agents of the central authority.
The centre in this paper refers to central government which is made up of three arms namely, the judiciary, legislature and the executive. This unitary system of government in Zimbabwe is underpinned by local authorities as lower tiers of government responsible for providing services at the local levels. Jordan grouped the services provided by local authorities into four categories- obligatory, optional, the amenities and the regulatory services.
The local government system in Zimbabwe is dualistic in nature, distinguished into urban local authorities 31 urban councils which comprises of local boards, town councils, municipalities and city councils as provided for in the Urban Councils Act, Chapter Chombo stressed that, the local government system in Zimbabwe is underpinned and predicated on a decentralized mode of governance premised on the virtues of the principle of subsidiarity.
He however contested that the extent to which the system is decentralized is controversial and subject to debate as decentralization is a process and not an event.
In attempting to evaluate the extent to which the system is decentralized, Chatizain de Visser [ 4 ], submitted that political power processes and distributions and the shifting of central-local relations is evident in the contradiction between the concepts of local affairs or needs and locally elected decision makers on the one hand and division of functions between central government and local government as well as the notion of transfer of functions inherent in the decentralization of functions on the other.
The distinction and sharing of power, functions and resources have always been a centre of controversy with central government trying to maintain its control over local government and the later demanding more space to perform its functions with minimal influence and control of the centre.
A new relationship between central and local government | Society | The Guardian
It is also important to note that different governments have different political purposes and motives for introducing decentralization and these intentions are embodied in the structure and form of decentralization or, more subtly, are revealed in how the system functions after it is introduced.
Conceptualization of Central-local Government Relations The study, conceptualization, theorization and analysis of central local government relationship have proved to be a challenging assignment and expectation among various government officials, scholars and political analysts. In the same context, an analysis of British contemporary central-local relations by Ogborn [ 6 ] may well be considered as a synthesis of the above argument.
Ogborn challenged the orthodox dualistic analysis of central-local government relationship presented in the nineteenth century and argued that local power does not rest within conceptions of communities or in the ideology of local possessive pluralism characteristic of ratepayer democracies but in the administrative structure of spatial state apparatus.
Although the above arguments may have some stereotype ideals, it is important however to rationalize that decentralization is a creature of state governments who retains the prerogative of determining the quality and quantity of authority to devolve to local governments.
Whilst it has been the general supposition that the state exist for the general good of its people which among other efforts may involve the decentralization of sufficient authority to local authorities for the efficient provision of services to citizens, this may be contradicted as an overstatement and oversimplification as some bureaucracies have attempted to concentrate power at national levels leaving local governments as mere extensions of central government authority.
It therefore becomes contestable whether decentralization as summed in government policy theory has enhanced local autonomy or whether there is an increased propensity towards recentralization.
These intentions are embodied in the structure and form of decentralization or, more subtly, are revealed in how the system functions after it is introduced. But political variables determine decentralization outcomes in terms of greater responsiveness and poverty reductionnot only because of variations in formal structure or technical failures of implementation, but also because decentralization is essentially about distribution of power and resources, both among different levels and territorial areas of the state and among different interests in their relationship to ruling elites.
In the African context, the politics of ethno-regional conflict is particularly important in shaping the structure of decentralization and indeed the extent to which it is accepted at all by the ruling elite.
It is difficult to find any positive assessments of these countries in the research literature. Ogborn opined that, the understanding of central-local government relations as part of a modern states government extension of surveillance across its territory is elucidated and substantiated through an analysis of the form of these relationships particularly the rationality and yields. The paper contextualized the Zimbabwean central-local government relations within the broader framework of the pluralist theory which emphasized on interdependency, diversity and the dynamic interaction of relatively independent layers of government.
To streamline the focus of the paper, the following analytical framework was used: Machingauta noted that, although they are body corporates, local authorities remained creatures of statutes with no constitutional recognition of their existence. In essence this implies that local government in Zimbabwe is a decentralised devolved level of governance which authority is derived from Acts of Parliament and not enshrined in the constitution.
Local authorities in Zimbabwe are administered through panoply of Acts of Parliament enacted by the Zimbabwean legislature. The various legislative instruments inter alia the Urban Councils Act, chapter The Ministry of Local Government administers all the Acts and Statutory Instruments promulgated in the local government area.
The minister is supposedly considered to be acting in the best interest of the citizens. In Marchthe minister appointed a resuscitation team for the Municipality of Chitungwiza after the dismissal of key council staff including the town clerk on grounds of corruption and abuse of office.
Indeed the allegations levelled against the council officials pointed to irregularities in financial management, allocation of stands and violation of employment procedures. Organisational arrangement of central and local government from a personnel perspective The organisational and structural arrangement of local government presents an important dichotomy in understanding the manifestations of power and responsibility allocation and distribution between the parent ministry and local authorities.
The minister retains the overall supervisory, coordination and control authority on the behaviour of local authorities. However, local authorities at provincial and district levels are accountable to the minister via the Provincial Administrator P. A and District Administrator D.
One of the key result areas of D. As is to supervise and monitor local authorities and as such they are ex-officio members of full council and committees of council. While local authorities have the power to employ non-director employees, the appointment of directors is subject to approval by the local government board in terms of section of the Urban Councils Act chapter Members of this board are appointed by the minister and therefore hold office at his discretion an issue that have raised eyebrows and controversy over the transparency of this statutory board which have been blamed of rubber stamping the whims of the minister.
Financing of local government functions-the common resource base problem Central government through Acts of parliament determines and delimits the sources from which local authorities can raise revenue for their day to day functionality.
Local government revenue sources include but are not limited to service charges, rates, property tax, and grants from central government, rent on property leased, and borrowing subject to approval by the minister.
At the same time central government gets income from sources including PAYE, import and export duties, and royalties on mineral resources. It therefore appears that central government income sources are easier to collect relative to those of local authorities. But translating this general invitation into concrete action has been difficult, and neither the government nor local authority partners would claim that tangible gains had been made.
Local PSAs are, by contrast, emerging as an effective, and potentially highly effective, route for councils to win more freedom to get on with delivering services with reduced interference from central government.
They are different because agreeing with ministers what flexibility can be given is part of the deal. In order to improve school results, for instance, the local PSA authority will want greater flexibility to construct the right local education policy.
For the pilots, this involves greater freedom and certainty of funding in the council's share of the school standards fund. For some of the pilots, there is also a commitment to work with the Department for Education and Employment to streamline the number of education plans required from a council.
A new relationship between central and local government
Some authorities have promised to increase rates of recycling. Local PSA pilots have also been allowed to test out the concept of unsupported credit approvals - councils borrowing above their allocated credit approvals, providing they are willing to meet the cost of those loans from within their own budget.
On youth justice, Sunderland hopes to agree flexibility in the way it uses youth justice funding. The council will now be able to bring more coherence to young offender support initatives.
Complex rules have made this difficult in the past. The government has made clear that flexibility will not always be available as a ready package for the start of the three-year life of a PSA.