How to Make a Platonic Relationship Work: 6 Steps (with Pictures)
Plato, dialectic is essentially the method for arriving at the definition of a thing.2 Wilhelm A. de Pater, Les Topiques d'Aristote et la dialectique platonicienne: metho- . What is at issue here is the precise relationship between the "up-. dAristote et la dialectique platonicienne: la methodologie de la definition. a Renaissance view of rhetoric and poetry and their relation to philosophy". In Arts . L'entretien dialectique, en effet, n'est pas une libre conversation, ni une topiques d Aristote et la dialectique platonicienne: La méthodologie de la définition (Fribourg, On the close relationship between topics and forensic disputation, see.
He amassed a substantial fortune and made a provision in his will that this money should be used to establish a chair of mathematics. Significantly, it was not to be attached to the University of Paris but was instead to have the same type of special conditions granted to regius professors. He formulated his ideas on logic in s and the early s, and it is during this period that he gave most explicit expression to his anti-Aristotelianism.
In he published a logic textbook in French, entitled Dialectique, which in many ways provided a clear indication of his ambitions and aims. Although he had become well known for his Latin eloquence, he broke with the scholastic tradition by writing in the vernacular.
The following year he published the same book in Latin under the title Dialecticae libri duo henceforth Dialectica. It was later printed in many different languages, and hundreds of editions of the Latin version were published. The book was widely disseminated and used at schools and universities throughout Europe, mostly in the Protestant countries. It was a kind of companion to the Dialecticae institutiones, published two years earlier. A second edition, entitled Rhetorica, though popular and frequently reprinted in new editions, never attained the diffusion and influence of his logic textbook.
During the late s and the s Ramus published his lectures on the various arts, including physics and metaphysics. While his textbooks were succinctly organized according to very strict principles, the lectures Scholae were less laconic and offered more detailed discussion. They were later collected together and published as Scholae in liberales artes in a Basel edition of Ramus also turned his hand to mathematics, although his knowledge of the subject was limited.
He had problems at first understanding the Greek mathematicians, and later he recalled his early encounter with them: Nancelius Petri Rami Vita: Yet, from the very beginning, he was convinced of the importance of mathematics.
In any case, he improved his abilities in both Greek and mathematics, and in his will he stipulated that the holder of the chair he wanted to endow should be an expert in both. He was confident that there was a natural way to think and argue and also to calculate. Arts should therefore always be built of parts that represent this true nature. Mathematics should mirror a natural mathematical thinking. We will see below how significant this thought was for Ramus when he worked out his syllabus and his method.
Ramus addressed the challenge of his weak knowledge of mathematics not only by improving his ability but also by grasping its history. It became essential for him not only to distinguish those who in the past had contributed to make mathematics an art but also those who in different ways had tried to undermine it.
In his early writings, he seems mostly to have been focused on the natural aspects of mathematics and looked on it as an expression of natural dialectic; but later on he turned his attention more to the practical or useful aspects of mathematics. He even condemned the way Euclid had, in his view, destroyed what was natural in mathematics and instead filled it with subtleties.
In the Prooemium mathematicum and later in Scholae mathematicae, he criticized the theoretical works of the ancient Greek mathematicians on the grounds that they were confusing and led away from the usefulness of the discipline for practitioners. The famous Danish astronomer Tycho Brahe — left a report of an encounter he had with Ramus in Augsburg inregistering his own amazement at this attitude. Ramus even promised to let anyone who could create an astronomy without hypotheses take over his own royal chair.
Of course, no one seriously claimed to have succeeded until Kepler in mockingly declared himself entitled to it Skalnik Although Ramus challenged the values and educational principles of scholasticism, he never attempted to discuss theological issues.
Platonic love - Wikipedia
His sole interest was in reforming the curriculum of the arts faculty. Nevertheless, during his final years he wrote a book on Christian theology, the Commentariorum de religione Christiana libri quatuor, which was published posthumously. The most striking feature of this work was that Ramus defined theology as the art of living virtuously, ars bene vivendi, adopting an essentially Zwinglian point of view. Theology may give us the rules by means of which we can and must live, but it cannot bring us salvation.
In a particularly interesting chapter of the treatise I: Mostly he sided with a Zwinglian against a Genevan position, as he did in the sacramental theology.
Unfortunately, no trace of these writings has survived. Nancelius was eager to mention that he had collaborated with Ramus in planning a long series of works on mathematics. Carl Prantl, for instance, claimed that Ramus had no talent whatsoever for philosophy and logic Prantl — Kneale and Kneale Ong was also keen to point out his incompetence Ong Without engaging in arguments with these scholars, it is still legitimate to ask what it was that made Ramus so popular and so controversial.
The arts faculty was supposed to prepare young students for further studies in theology, medicine or jurisprudence.
Most students, however, never advanced to these higher faculties but left the university for employment in the Church. The arts curriculum had been geared toward this situation since the Middle Ages. The political developments which led to the rise of a new kind of state in the Renaissance also affected the educational program of universities. In the short term, rulers tried to find quick and practical solutions such as special colleges or special professorships; but in the long run, more thorough measures, which included establishing new institutions and devising new curricula, were needed.
The arts faculty had gradually changed, and what we now call the humanities history, literature, rhetoric and ethics had started to play a more important role. The stress on some aspects of logic and metaphysics, characteristic of the medieval arts faculty, was becoming obsolete. A new curriculum adjusted to the humanities was therefore necessary.
Ramus was most concerned about the obvious lack of efficiency of the scholastic curriculum that he had observed as a student. According to him, students had to spend too many years learning too little of use for them. From his own experience, he knew the importance of hard work, and he wanted to make it possible for students of more humble means to study and, by diligent application, reach their goals more quickly.
Therefore, he needed to make education much cheaper by shortening the amount of time students put into studying. To achieve this, he had to reflect on the pedagogical means and goals Hotson It is unlikely, however, that such a disputation ever took place since no one apart from Freigius mentions it. Yet Ramus was hardly a typical anti-Aristotelian in the mold of Luther or other impassioned anti-intellectuals. Though many of his followers could be considered zealots, he himself was insistent on pointing out the difference between what he referred to as the true and the false Aristotle.
Attacks on Aristotle were often launched by those who emphasized the fact that he had not been a Christian; some fanatics even thought that his philosophy had paved the way for Satan. Ramus did not share this view. According to him, it was not because Aristotle had been a pagan that he was wrong but rather because he had been misinterpreted by later commentators.
Ramus claimed that his work to reform the curriculum had begun during his early schooldays. As a young student he had to endure the inadequate way in which Aristotle was taught; no one seemed to care if young boys could ever use what they had learnt.
In fact, he emphasized the value of Aristotelian philosophy. He considered Aristotle to be the most important of logicians, though he pointed out that Aristotle had not invented the discipline of logic but rather developed what his predecessors had hinted at.
This is also why the Organon gives the impression of being an amalgamation of different subjects. Ramus laid the blame for all of this on the shoulders of the ancient and medieval commentators who he thought had for centuries misinterpreted the Greek philosopher owing to the poor condition of the Aristotelian corpus. The Philosopher himself had intentionally made his theories a little more abstruse than they needed to be in order to sift the wheat from the chaff among his disciples Ramus, Scholae dialecticae, in Scholae in liberales artes, col.
To Ramus, Aristotle was a Socratic philosopher, whose approach was broadly in line with that of Cicero. Let us ignore all these Aristotelians and return to Aristotle, the author of such a noble discipline [i. Ramus, Collectaneae praefationes, epistolae, orationes, p. The conflict may not have been based solely on a difference of philosophical opinions. Schegk had a grudge against Ramus, who had pulled one of his books to pieces.
The discussion nevertheless forced Ramus to reconsider some of his positions. In this work he makes clear the difference between his position, which he maintained had also been that of Aristotle, and the view of Schegk and other Aristotelians.
The question at stake was what logic really was: According to the Aristotelians, the different parts of the Organon—the Categories, On Interpretation, the Prior and Posterior Analytics, the Topics and the Sophistical Refutations—corresponded to the different parts of logic. There was, for instance, an essential difference between probability the subject of the Topics and certainty dealt with in the two Analytics.
The Aristotelians defined philosophy as a habitus intellectualis, a rational attitude toward being. In looking at being we can try to understand it; but we can also, as humans, use our knowledge to act rightly or wrongly toward other humans. For this reason, Aristotle divided philosophy into a theoretical part and a practical part. Logic, however, does not fit into this division of philosophy because it does not give us any knowledge at all of being.
It is instead a way of acquiring knowledge and of finding the truth. According to the Aristotelians, philosophy always concerns the rational aspects of human beings; their productive aspects, by contrast, belong to the practical disciplines or arts.
For the Aristotelian, it was essential to separate science and philosophy from the arts. Yet while Aristotle had firmly rooted his philosophical theories in an attitude toward being, educational practice in schools was concerned solely with theorems and rules.
Young pupils had to study not being in a theoretical and abstract way but rather the items that the teacher demanded them to learn, often by heart. The Stoic conception of philosophy, therefore, was often far more suitable to a classroom situation. For the Stoics, the universe was rationally organized in a way that was directly equivalent to human reason. They believed that there was a correspondence in the universe, or in nature, between order and reason and that the reason which organized and governed the universe was essentially the same as human reason.
The connection between nature and reason could be studied from three different perspectives: One consequence of the Stoic theory was that there must be an absolute analogy between the contents of an art and those of nature, that is, all arts must also be about nature or being. There could not be a difference of rank between the parts of nature, nor between the parts of philosophy, as the Aristotelians thought. Another consequence was that logic became an integral part of philosophy rather than an instrument to be used by the other branches of the discipline.
His definition of philosophy as a cognitio artium liberalium, a knowledge of the liberal arts, reveals both the influence of Stoicism and of the medieval educational tradition. Ramus thus regarded logic as a part of philosophy and defined it as an art that truly gives us knowledge of being. At times, he claimed to be the only true Aristotelian and criticized the scholastic Aristotelians for misinterpreting Aristotle.
On other occasions, he maintained that the entire Aristotelian tradition, including Aristotle himself, was totally wrong. This inconsistency is due to the fact that, true to his usual habit, he adopted different strategies in response to different polemical situations.
Although Ramus was an offspring of the Aristotelian tradition, he was also influenced by Ciceronian and Stoic ideas. Only rarely did he directly attack Aristotle himself. So, for example, whenever there was a clash between the Aristotelian and the Stoic way of thinking, he tried to solve the problem by pointing out differences between Aristotle and his later commentators.
It would consequently be a serious mistake to confuse one art with another. In the Posterior Analytics Aristotle had set out certain rules or laws for how a predicate should be related to a subject in order to make a correct scientific proposition.
Ramus took over these laws; but he applied them not only to propositions but also to the construction of entire arts. The first law, the lex veritatis, or law of truth, stated that every theorem in an art must be general and indispensable. For example, a theorem stating that the angle of a triangle is a right angle would not be a false statement since there are indeed triangles with right angles. But since it is not true in relation to all triangles, such a theorem would violate the law of truth.
A theorem which states that the sum of the degrees of the three angles of a triangle is would, however, be totally correct and generally true. The second law was called the lex justitiae, or law of justice.
Ramus regarded this as the most important of the three laws. It ensured that justice was done to all the arts. No theorem belonging to one art should be allowed to trespass into the subject matter of another, since that would be unjust. This law also demanded that all parts of an art should be homogeneous. He held that Copernicus was not allowed to put forward theories as to how the planets really moved in the heavens, which belonged to the art astrophysics, while at the same time using mathematical hypotheses, which belonged to the art of mathematics.
To Ramus, this law was fundamental for the purpose of organizing a new curriculum and was also, as we shall see, an important aspect of his method. The third law, the lex sapientiae, or law of wisdom, was the concrete principle of how an art should be organized according to general theorems.
A more general theorem should always precede a less general and more particular one. The theorem that an isosceles triangle has angles which add up to a total of degrees is quite correct; but since it is true for all triangles, it should precede theorems applicable to specific kinds of triangle.
This way of treating philosophy as an aggregate of rigidly separated arts may have had some pedagogical value, but it also raised difficulties. Ramus, for instance, could not accept metaphysics as a separate discipline, although in this case his nominalism was also in operation. By insisting that every art must have its correctly formulated theorems, organized from the more general to the more specific, and that no theorem should be allowed to have reference to more than one art, Ramus almost seems to impose a military discipline on nature.
Sometimes his followers defined philosophy as merely a methodical collection of arts, a collectio methodica, which reveals even more clearly their understanding of the discipline. On account of his idealistic belief in the correspondence between the arts—including their concepts and words—and being, some scholars have assumed that Ramus was reliant on Platonism. In his early writings he certainly assumed a clear metaphysical link between nature, mathematics and dialectic.
Indeed, his contemporaries sometimes called him the Plato Gallicus, the French Plato; but, in reality, the Platonic influences on him were rather vague and often concealed.
Gradually, the Platonic ontological strains in his works lost importance and faded away. Although he at times claimed to be a Platonist, his references to Plato were mostly aimed at distancing himself from Aristotle and, above all, from contemporary Aristotelians.
In practice, he was more often inspired by Cicero and by Stoicism than by Platonism. And despite his attacks on Aristotle, he was essentially dependent on the scholastic tradition cf. Logic and method 3. Ramus rejected the Aristotelian definition of logic as a habitus instrumentalis, since an instrumental attitude could be considered to be an effect of logic but not equivalent to it.
Instead he defined logic as the ars bene disserendi, the art of correctly discussing or analyzing something. Consequently, Ramus thought that logic was about being, which made metaphysics superfluous.
One of the logic books that students had for centuries studied was the Summulae logicales of Petrus Hispanus probably the same Petrus who was elected pope in and adopted the name John XXI. Even in the beginning of the sixteenth century the treatise was still in use and attracted severe criticism from humanists. Ramus stated explicitly that he wanted to remove the Summulae from the curriculum, and it was mainly this book that he was thinking about when he lamented his own youthful experiences of studying logic.
His devastating judgment on the book was that it had not made him more judicious in his studies of history and antiquity, nor more skilled in disputation, nor more competent at writing poetry, nor indeed more competent at anything at all….
Ramus, Scholae dialecticae, in Scholae in liberales artes, col. Therefore, to understand the development of Ramist logic, we have to pay attention to this scholastic background, as well as to Cicero, who played a key role in the advance of humanist logic. The categories praedicamenta are not only treated as a formal part of a proposition but also, and most importantly, as universals, which meant that their ontological status also had to be considered.
Cicero observed that the Aristotelians were mainly interested in the aspect of logic that he called the ars inveniendi, that is, the art of finding the right arguments. The Stoics, on the other hand, according to Cicero, were more concerned about the different aspects of the judgments that we make.
They wanted to analyze arguments. He called this kind of dialectic the ratio disserendi, a definition that Ramus, via Agricola, rephrased as the ars bene disserendi. While the Aristotelians thought that the categories were the natural introduction to logic, the Stoics preferred judgment.PHILOSOPHY - Plato
During the Middle Ages both the Peripatetic and the Stoic views on dialectic were preserved, the latter via Cicero and Augustine. In the first of these students could learn how to construct a proposition. In the second Petrus discussed the five praedicabilia that made it possible to classify different kinds of propositions.
The third tractatus dealt with the Categories, the fourth and the fifth with the problems that Aristotle had taken up in his Prior Analytics and in his Topics. The last seven treatises were concerned with specific logical problems such as significatio or suppositio.
With few exceptions these treatises do not correspond to any part of the Organon; instead, they are for the most part related to the parva logicalia, a form of medieval logical thinking which was especially repugnant to humanists.
The Posterior Analytics was hardly considered at all. The main emphasis at school was on teaching young boys to construct syllogisms. The purpose of the Summulae was not to train the students to reflect on the problem of how to make scientifically correct conclusions but rather to prepare them for what they normally were expected to do: In that respect the Summulae succeeded cf.
This book, printed for the first time inwas to a great extent influenced by humanism. Aristotle had considered the Topics or dialectic as a special kind of deduction.
This was the reason why Aristotelians wanted the study of logic to start with what Cicero and the humanists often called iudicium or judgment, to be learned from the Categories, On Interpretation and the two Analytics, before the student went on to the Topics. In his view, you must find the arguments before you can employ them in your argumentation. Aristotelians maintained instead that it was necessary to know what to do with arguments before you could go looking for them.
In fact, Agricola hardly touched on iudicium in the more than pages of his treatise. In concentrating on the Topics, it was much easier for him to lean on Cicero rather than on Aristotle. The close connection between inventio, as a part of logic, and the art of rhetoric made it seem, however, as if humanists could not separate the two disciplines.
Another weakness which Aristotelians often pointed out in Agricola and Ramus was that they were not interested in finding answers to difficult questions but rather in finding good arguments to use in defending a certain thesis Sellberg So, he added to inventio the other part of logic, iudicium.
Petrus Ramus (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
His most detailed discussion of iudicium was in the edition of the Dialectica, but this was neither the most read nor the most important edition. The shorter version, published inwas more suitable for schools and was therefore followed in most later editions. In the edition there are 32 chapters devoted to inventio and only 20 to iudicium. Every chapter was carefully constructed with questions and definitions of the main problems and with examples, mostly taken from ancient authors.
In his first treatise on logic, Dialecticae institutiones Ramus had divided iudicium into three parts: The third part was an odd element added in order to demonstrate that logic had a divine origin; three years later it was removed, never to return. Thereafter, he adopted a two-fold division of iudicium into the axiomaticum and the dianoeticum.
In the former part students learnt to organize the arguments found in inventio into a proposition or—as Stoics and even Ramus preferred to call it—an axioma. The second part of iudicium, the dianoeticum, was divided into syllogistic and method. The most remarkable aspect of his treatment of syllogistic was that Ramus admitted a syllogismus expositorius, in which the conclusion did not have to be about something universal but could be about something individual, as we can see from the example: Socrates is a philosopher; he is also a human being; consequently, there is at least one human being who is a philosopher.
As we have seen, he was determined to make it useful for the humanities. Given the Aristotelian demand that a scientific conclusion should always be universal, it was extremely difficult to deal with the uniqueness of history and literature in a scientific framework. This syllogism was an attempt to cope with that difficulty. It shows that his aim was instead to systemize and organize arguments. For Ramus, therefore, method became the most important part of logic. The problem was to determine whether method was a way of acquiring knowledge or of displaying it.
Discussions about methodological issues changed in this period from being merely commentaries on Aristotle to taking into account a wide range of considerations, including ones belonging to medicine and geometry. The concepts of analysis and synthesis, for example, were borrowed from geometry and soon became the main principles of method. The problem for many logicians was that it was impossible to find relevant discussions of these concepts in the Prior and Posterior Analytics, despite the titles of these treatises Gilbert It became obvious that more than one method could exist and that there was a difference between methodus and ordo.
The latter term came to be applied to a pedagogical method, a way of teaching or displaying. But it was also necessary to think about natural vs. Among Aristotelians there was considerable disagreement on these issues. But Ramus took an extreme position. He explicitly denied that there could be more than one method and that there was any difference between methodus and ordo. As a consequence of his definition of an art, he could not accept any uncertainty as to how one should proceed or as to whether the procedure should be natural or artificial.
In his succinct Latin formulation, he claimed that what was notiora nobis, more known to us, must be the same as what was notiora naturae, more known to nature. What is more general with respect to nature must consequently have priority in our method over what is more particular.
If you see a living creature in the distance, it is not until you are closer to it that you will be able to identify it as a human being, and it will take still more time before you can eventually recognize who it is. This example shows, according to Ramus, that a method which proceeds from the general to the particular is not arbitrary but natural Ramus, Quod sit unica doctrinae instituendae methodus, p.
Since it was obvious, at least to Ramus, that an argument is more general than an axioma, or proposition, and that an axioma is more general than a syllogism, this proved that his way of organizing logic was the correct one.
The other arts should, of course, be constructed in the same way. In medicine, for example, it is natural to start with the whole body before you go on to the limbs. When you cure a man who has a wound on his forehead, you can either say that you cure him or his whole body, but not that you cure his eyes or his belly, which, like his forehead, are parts of his body Ramus, Dialectica Every art must be founded on it, given that it was not merely the correct but the only method.
In describing the arts, he and his followers often used large dichotomies, set out in diagrams or tables; but it is important to note that these dichotomies were an instrument to display the structure of an art. They were not—as many historians have supposed—the same thing as the method. Ramus thought it essential to construct a system of precepts arranged according to their degree of generalization, always starting with the more general and proceeding toward the more specific.
This would make the method natural, so that it reflects nature, just as the arts do. To stress this point, Ramus in some of his writings preferred to call the second part of logic not iudicium but dispositio or arrangement. Ramus was aware of the difficulty of demonstrating his natural method in literature. This was a particular problem for him since he wanted students to learn the method by reading the great authors of antiquity.
According to him, the method was also used by poets like Virgil and Horace. He had to admit, however, that the ancients had sometimes intentionally departed from it. Therefore, in earlier editions of the Dialectica he had included another method, a methodus prudentiae, which, as he pointed out, was really no different from the one method. Philosophical interpretation[ edit ] Platonic love is examined in Plato's dialogue, the Symposiumwhich has as its topic the subject of love or Eros generally.
It explains the possibilities of how the feeling of love began and how it has evolved—both sexually and non-sexually. Of particular importance is the speech of Socrateswho attributes to the prophetess Diotima an idea of platonic love as a means of ascent to contemplation of the divine. The step of this ascent is known as the "Ladder of Love".
For Diotima, and for Plato generally, the most correct use of love of human beings is to direct one's mind to love of divinity. Socrates defines love based on separate classifications of pregnancy to bear offspring ; pregnancy of the body, pregnancy of the soul, and direct connection to Being. Pregnancy of the body results in human children.
Pregnancy of the soul, the next step in the process, produces " virtue " — which is the soul truth translating itself into material form. Pausanias, in Plato's Symposium b—aexplained two types of love or Eros—Vulgar Eros or earthly love and Divine Eros or divine love. Vulgar Eros is nothing but mere material attraction towards a beautiful body for physical pleasure and reproduction. Divine Eros begins the journey from physical attraction, i. This concept of Divine Eros is later transformed into the term platonic love.
Vulgar Eros and Divine Eros are both connected and part of the same continuous process of pursuing totality of being itself,  with the purpose of mending human nature, eventually reaching a point of unity where there is no longer an aspiration to change.
Most modern people would think of Eros as a concept rather than a god. This is an example of cultural relativitybecause the modern interpretation of the term is different from the ancient Greek interpretation. Virtue is the result of pregnancy of the soul. This can be seen as a form of linguistic relativity. Some modern authors perception of the terms "virtue" and "good" as they are translated into English from the Symposium are a good indicator of this misunderstanding. In the following quote, the author simplifies the idea of virtue as simply what is "good".
Each step closer to the truth further distances love from beauty of the body toward love that is more focused on wisdom and the essence of beauty. Eventually, in time, with consequent steps up the ladder, the idea of beauty is eventually no longer connected with a body, but entirely united with Being itself. These two extremes of love are seen by the Greeks in terms of tragedy and comedy.
According to Diotima in her discussion with Socrates, for anyone to achieve the final rung in the Ladder of Love, they would essentially transcend the body and rise to immortality - gaining direct access to Being. Such a form of love is impossible for a mortal to achieve.
This is the type of love, that, according to Socrates, is practiced by animals.