Burma | United States Trade Representative
In the past, Congress and the executive branch placed several economic restrictions on relations with Burma that have. How Myanmar Benefits from the US-China Competition in the Indo-Pacific Is this a real shift in North Korea-Myanmar relations, or just political expediency?. U.S.–MYANMAR COMMERCIAL RELATIONS: THE NEXT PHASE | JUNE to encourage reform and promote sustainable economic growth. The initial U.S.
Neither the President nor the State Department has used the authority granted by these two laws. The following persons shall be ineligible for a visa to travel to the United States: D The immediate family members of any person described in subparagraphs A through C. The JADE Act authorizes the President to waive the visa ban if "the President determines and certifies in writing to Congress that travel by the person seeking such a waiver is in the national interest of the United States.
Section b 2 prohibits the appropriation of funds, to Burma and other countries, "to support any military training or operations that include child soldiers," or for "tear gas, small arms, light weapons, ammunition, or other items for crowd control purposes for foreign security forces that use excessive force to repress peaceful expression, association, or assembly in countries undergoing democratic transition.
Bilateral economic assistance Title III: These include the following: Prohibition on the Sale of U. Military Equipment—On June 9,the State Department's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs issued Public Notice suspending "all export licenses and other approvals to export or otherwise transfer defense articles or defense services to Burma. Prohibition on Military Training or Operations that Include Child Soldiers—From toand again inBurma was designated by the State Department as a country whose government has armed forces or government-supported armed groups that recruit and use child soldiers.
Global Magnitsky Sanctions In latethe Tatmadaw conducted a "clearance operation" in northern Rakhine State in response to attacks on security outposts along the border with Bangladesh, during which Burma's security forces may have committed genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.
Satellite imagery confirms that over Rohingya villages were partially or totally destroyed during the Tatmadaw's operation. The United Nations and other organizations have interviewed Rohingya survivors, who recount stories of mass killings, torture, and rape perpetrated by Tatmadaw soldiers and other Burmese security officers. Waived or Lapsed Restrictions As noted above, some of the laws imposing sanctions on Burma also include provisions whereby the President could waive, temporarily or permanently, the sanctions under certain conditions.
In addition, some of the laws also contain provisions by which the President can terminate the sanctions. President Obama waived several restrictions, but also stated that waivers could be reversed, and the restrictions reimposed, if conditions in Burma so warrant. Economic Restrictions In the past, Congress and the executive branch placed several economic restrictions on relations with Burma that have been subsequently terminated, waived, or suspended, including a general ban on the import of goods from Burma; a ban on the import of Burmese jadeite and rubies, and products containing Burmese jadeite and rubies; a ban on the import of goods from certain Burmese companies; the "freezing" of the assets of certain Burmese nationals; a prohibition on providing financial services to certain Burmese nationals; restrictions on U.
Ban on Import of Products of Burma Section 3 and 3A of the BFDA as amended banned the importation of "any article that is a product of Burma," goods and services from certain Burmese companies, jadeite and rubies from Burma, and articles of jewelry containing jadeite or rubies from Burma.
This ban, however, was subject to annual renewal by Congress passing a resolution as stipulated in Section 9 b of the same act.
From toCongress passed the annual renewal resolution, but has not done so since. As a consequence, these restrictions contained in Section 3 and 3A of the BFDA have lapsed, but could be reinstated by the passage of the required resolution.
On August 7,President Obama issued Executive Orderreinstating the ban on the import of jadeite and rubies from Burma, and articles of jewelry containing jadeite or rubies from Burma.
Executive Orderhowever, was revoked on October 7,when President Obama issued Executive Orderthereby terminating the ban on the import of jadeite and rubies from Burma. Restrictions on the Provision of Financial Services As described above, Section 5 b of the JADE Act freezes the assets of persons described by Section 5 a 1 of the act, and bars the payment or transfer of any property, or "any transactions involving the transfer of anything of economic value," as well as the "export or reexport directly or indirectly, of any goods, technology, or services" to persons described by Section 5 a 1 of the act, or to "any entity, owned, controlled, or operated by the SPDC or by an individual described in such subsection.
The President is hereby authorized to prohibit, and shall prohibit United States persons from new investment in Burma, if the President determines and certifies to Congress that, after the date of enactment of this Act, the Government of Burma has physically harmed, rearrested for political acts, or exiled Daw Aung San Suu Kyi or has committed large-scale repression of or violence against the Democratic opposition.
Pursuant to Section e of the same act, the Department of State having been delegated authority by President Obama waived the investment restrictions on Section b effective July 11,having determined that it would be contrary to the national security interests of the United States to continue the restrictions. A humanitarian assistance, B subject to the regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations, counter-narcotics assistance under chapter 8 of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act ofor crop substitution assistance, if the Secretary of State certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that— i the Government of Burma is fully cooperating with United States counter-narcotics efforts, and ii the programs are fully consistent with United States human rights concerns in Burma and serve the United States national interest, and C assistance promoting human rights and democratic values.
The act also provided that these restrictions were to remain in effect "[u]ntil such time as the President determines and certifies to Congress that Burma has made measurable and substantial progress in improving human rights practices and implementing democratic government.
U.S. Restrictions on Relations with Burma
Section of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, P. In SeptemberCongress passed P. President Obama issued a memorandum on October 10,delegating the authority granted by P. In Novemberwhen asked if she would like to see U. We're not afraid of scrutiny. We believe that if we are going along the right path, all sanctions should be lifted in good time. In a press statement following her meeting in the Oval Office with President Obama on September 14,Aung San Suu Kyi stated, "We think that the time has now come to remove all the sanctions that hurt us economically, because our country is in a position to open up to those who are interested in taking part in our economic enterprises.
As a result, they have opposed the imposition of sanctions on Burma in response to the events in Rakhine State, including the Treasury's placement of five senior military officers and two military units on its SDN list. Congressional Considerations Congress may examine a number of different factors as it considers whether to alter U. One question is whether to reassess the goals of U.
Another factor is how to evaluate the current political situation in Burma, and whether further political and economic reforms are likely.
Congress may also examine to what extent restrictions on relations enhance or harm developments in Burma that are consistent with U. Policy For many years, Congress and the executive branch have, in general, shared a common view on the broader goals of U. We want to see a peaceful, prosperous, democratic Myanmar.
One whose people live in harmony and enjoy full rights. Among the specific objectives for U. Moving beyond these general goals, however, may reveal underlying contradictions between the different goals.
Efforts to promote economic prosperity in Burma, for example, may run counter to establishing a democratically elected civilian government.
Myanmar–United States relations - Wikipedia
Efforts to promote economic prosperity by permitting U. Further political and economic reform could depend on the Burmese military's willingness to relinquish some or all of its seats in the Union Parliament, as well as its control over the appointment of the Ministers of Border Affairs, Defence, and Home Affairs.
At the same time, however, it is also possible that permitting U. Congress may explore these questions further. Burma's Current Political Situation Aung San Suu Kyi has emerged as the dominant political figure in the NLD-led government, and is using her authority as State Counselor and Foreign Minister to set priorities and oversee implementation of government policy. Depending on how the dynamics between Aung San Suu Kyi and other influential figures and forces such as Commander in Chief Min Aung Hlaing and the ethnic armed organizations proceed, Congress may choose to assess if her views on specific issues are consistent with U.
Understanding the views of Burma's military leaders has always been crucial in forming a framework to understand Burmese political conditions. It was Burma's military leaders that effectively wrote the constitution, held the parliamentary elections inand formed the core of the Thein Sein government that ran the country from to The political and economic reforms that have occurred in Burma since are either the direct results of the actions of Burma's military leaders or were undertaken with the support of the military leaders.
Those reforms have been generally consistent with the "seven step roadmap to a disciplined democracy" announced by General Khin Nyunt, the military junta's Prime Minister, on August 30, In the various meetings and conferences held to discuss a path to ending Burma's civil war, Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing and other Tatmadaw representatives have demonstrated little willingness to negotiate.
As a result, it appears unlikely that Burma's military leaders will be supportive of or willing to allow the political and economic reforms proposed by the NLD-led government, and they will resist efforts to fundamentally alter the current governance system.
Similarly, the opinions of the various EAOs may play a vital role in achieving U. Achieving the former may require major changes in the constitution including its possible replacement with a new constitution and Burma's economy, particularly control over the nation's natural resources. Such changes may be unacceptable to Burma's military or the NLD-led government. Defeating the EAOs in the battlefield, however, may be beyond the capabilities of the Burmese military without substantial international assistance, as well as the support of the NLD-led government.
During the decades of military rule, Burma's military leaders actively suppressed the establishment of CSOs in order to maintain control over the Burmese people. The Thein Sein government allowed the emergence of issue-driven CSOs in Burma, and some of them have undertaken causes generally consistent with U.
One such observer expressed concern that national reconciliation, if left to the NLD-led government, the Burmese military, and the EAOs, could result in the establishment of a federation of "crony states," in which the current military leaders and their supporters in each region of Burma control both the political and economic systems, and prevent the establishment of a democratic civilian government based on the rule of law and the will of the Burmese people.
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- Myanmar–United States relations
The United States will use all of our available engagement tools to deepen democratic gains, promote good governance and transparency, and strengthen democratic institutions. We believe this step has the potential to make an important contribution to goals we share with the new government: This action will take effect on November 13, following a day Congressional notification period. Acknowledging the dramatic transformations that have taken place in Burma, including the inauguration of a democratically-elected government, the announcement of a new partnership reflects our shared desire to build a broad, forward-looking relationship between our two countries.
The Partnership will provide a framework for advancing key priorities in our bilateral relationship, and will create mechanisms for cooperation in areas including political and diplomatic relations, trade and economic ties, science and technology, education and training, environment and health, defense and security, protection and promotion of rule of law, human rights, and people-to-people connections.
In support of the U. The location of the meetings will alternate between the two countries.
The key thematic areas of engagement could include: The funding would expand our reach to more states and regions across Burma, including funding a new advisor in Mandalay. We will also strengthen English language teacher capacity in Burma through additional direct training for 1, English Access Micro-scholarship teachers and other Burmese English language educators from across the country.
The training will include workshops and networking opportunities with subject experts on modern teaching methodologies. Deepening Bilateral Economic Engagement The United States and Burma recognize their shared interest in enhancing bilateral economic engagement and exchanging views on laws and practices that affect bilateral investment flows and foreign investment, including the elements of a high-standard Bilateral Investment Treaty.
New Loan Portfolio Guarantee In Burma, a lack of access to credit is one of the largest constraints to small business growth: This program will increase the availability of and access to food.
Many of the targeted enterprises are expected to be owned or operated by women. This loan program will be accompanied by technical assistance to both the microfinance institutions and the government on regulatory changes needed to expand access to credit.